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Lewis: A Negotiated Instrument: Proposing a Safer Contract for Consumers (And Not Just a Smarter One)

A NEGOTIATED INSTRUMENT: PROPOSING A
SAFER CONTRACT FOR CONSUMERS
(AND NOT JUST A SMARTER ONE)
By Michael S. Lewis*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I propose a new standard for determining what
constitutes assent, as a matter of contract formation, within the domain
of electronic consumer contracting. The threshold test should reject
the “take-it-or-leave-it” arrangement dominant in the marketplace
and reified by recent proposals before the American Law Institute
(“ALI”) under the moniker “blanket assent.” The new standard should
reject blanket assent in favor of a default rule that would require any
electronic form proposing contract terms to permit at least a minimal
amount of negotiation around terms seeking waiver of rights from
consumers. I propose this rule as a more acceptable behavioral proxy
in determining whether the manifestation of the mutual assent
standard applicable to all contracts performed by competent
contracting parties is met. Requiring negotiation and negotiability
from electronic forms will go further than the current “click-through”
baseline to cure the current problem of consumer incapacity widely
recognized (though not widely named) in the consumer marketplace.
It is that disturbingly debased status that defines the plight of the
consumer in the modern consumer contracting domain (a point I make
in a related, earlier piece). This Article argues that technology has
advanced to such an extent that the absence of greater negotiability
* Michael S. Lewis is a shareholder at Rath, Young and Pignatelli, P.C., and an adjunct professor of
law at University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law and Vermont Law School, where he
teaches courses in contracts, sales, and evidence. Special thanks to William Ardinger, Mark Budnitz, Jean
Galbraith, Steve Lauwers, William Magnusson, Kevin Scura, Kate Skouteris, and Chris Sullivan for their
comments and feedback on this paper. This Article is dedicated to the late-Professor Stephen Sugarman,
who taught his students to ask more from the common law than rote application of poorly constructed
doctrine.
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can no longer be defended with regard to electronic forms. As an
example of this technology, I use the life of a wager from the online
sports gaming business to make this point. Given what this gaming
technology demonstrates, we are now able to see how technology may
facilitate ever greater consumer interface around pricing, risk-taking,
risk-prediction, and active choice in relation to qualitative events,
features, and outcomes online. Using this technology, in conjunction
with contract law and tort law norms, this Article argues that a recent
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court analyzing
Uber’s electronic form should demand more from sellers than the
“click-through” option the court appears to set, as a baseline, for
accomplishing assent with regard to electronic consumer contracting
formation.
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INTRODUCTION
A few months before the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic crushed us all,
I went into my primary care doctor’s office to have my annual
physical. Checking in, I sat down across from an administrator who
asked the standard questions that I have come to expect when going to
this practice. My insurance had not changed. My date of birth recedes
from sight with each coming day, while remaining tethered to the same
starting point. My wife is, remarkably, still married to me, and her
phone number remains the same.
Having survived that gauntlet, I prepared to stand up and walk to
the general waiting area to have my name called by one of the
practice’s begowned employees before being weighed and measured,
per usual. But the hospital added a step. The kind administrator flipped
over a screen she had been reviewing and said, in a tone more
perfunctory than demanding, “Please review and sign this at the lower
righthand corner.”
The interaction posed a basic test. I had just written a draft of a law
review article challenging default claims regarding adult capacity to
contract in very similar situations.1 In the article, my critique of
contemporary consumer contracts was that the form she was about to
present to me was not really a “contract” because adults are not capable
of rendering them so in most situations, including the one at hand.2 I
argued that adults do not engage or understand these sorts of
documents and their contents, and, even if they did, they could not
bargain for a better deal to protect important interests that they should,
rationally, seek to protect.3 I further argued that adults have been, and
1. See generally Michael S. Lewis, Pervasive Infancy: Reassessing the Contract Capacity of Adults
in Modern America, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 69 (2020).
2. See id. at 75 (“Together, all of these forces have altered the status of American adults with regard
to the law of consumer contracts. American adults are now no differently positioned from American
children in regard to their capacity to enter most, if not all, of the consumer contracts they execute.”).
3. See id. at 77–78 (discussing capacity as defined by Martha Nussbaum in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011)). With my wife, Leah A.
Plunkett, a fellow law professor, I have since discussed my growing concerns regarding this phenomenon
within the area of contracts posed to parents in the context of educating children during the COVID-19
pandemic. See Leah A. Plunkett & Michael S. Lewis, Education Contracts of Adhesion in the COVID-19
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are being, infantilized by this state of affairs in commercial life and
should be able to access defenses commensurate with their degraded
status as a means of protection and as a means of reestablishing
agency.4
In advancing this argument, I relied upon what I viewed as a sharper,
stronger, and more realistic conceptualization of capacity provided by
leading scholars in the area, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, a
Nobel Prize winning economist.5 This conception acknowledged that
capacity is a function both of one’s internal capabilities and the
potential that a person may deploy those capabilities to shape their
experience.6
Having set out to solve a problem in the area of consumer contracts,
I decided that I was obliged to test out my sense of things in my own
situation at the doctor’s office. After all, where better to attain
capability than in a setting designed to provide for my health and
well-being? Where better to strike out for adults everywhere and do
something I had never done before as a consumer? I would try to
reclaim my capacity. I would not just sign away my rights,
unthinkingly, to go from intake to physical to a blueprint for my own
personal health and well-being. I would read the contract. I would ask
questions about it. And I would try to alter it through negotiation that
I deemed promoted my overall best interests.

Pandemic, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 13–15, https://www.illinoislawreview.org/online/educationcontracts-of-adhesion-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/VP3J-R2NT] (discussing concerns
about the capacities of parents to protect their children through one-sided contracts presented to them
under desperate circumstances).
4. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 82–83, 117–25; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 568 (1985) (“At the individual level, most people . . . simply cannot make
their way safely through the maze.”). Immanuel Kant apparently expressed similar concerns at a more
general level. See RITCHIE ROBERTSON, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 1680–1790,
at 30 (HarperCollins Publishers 2021) (2020) (Kant argued that “[m]ost people . . . . allow guardians of
various kinds to think for them, and the guardians are only too happy to take control and reduce their
charges to a position like that of domestic animals, or small children who cannot walk without leading
strings.” (footnote omitted)).
5. Lewis, supra note 1, at 78 & n.31 (first citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 20, 25; and then citing
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75 (1999)) (discussing how Nussbaum and Sen define
“capacity” in their respective works).
6. Id. at 78; cf. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 14–15 (reprt. 1987) (1984) (describing at
least one perspective in which the direction of one’s life and fate is determined and beyond the capability
of any person to affect).
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The “contract” that the healthcare provider presented to me had a
number of paragraphs, which spanned three pages.7 Some of the
paragraphs included procedural authorizations. 8 Some related to
healthcare privacy and reaffirmed that I had this privacy.9 These
proposed terms seemed unobjectionable to me. The final paragraph,
though, was alarming. It essentially stated that the doctor’s office was
part of a larger healthcare system that employs independent third
parties from time to time. It further stated: “I understand and
acknowledge that [the hospital] cannot be held . . . liable for the
conduct of these providers.”10
A recent memory immediately popped into my head. At another
local hospital, an employee contaminated needles and spread Hepatitis
C through the patient population.11 The employee, “employed as a
[healthcare] technician at [the other hospital] in 2011 . . . [,] devised a
scheme to divert and steal . . . Fentanyl for personal use and abuse.”12
Indeed, the employee admitted:
[H]e would surreptitiously take syringes of Fentanyl
prepared for patients, inject himself with the drug and refill
the syringes with saline, causing the syringes to become
tainted with his infected blood. He then replaced the tainted
syringes for use on unsuspecting patients. Consequently,
instead of receiving the prescribed dose of Fentanyl together
with its intended anesthetic effect, patients actually received
saline that was tainted with the same strain of Hepatitis C

7. Treatment Authorization and Admininistrative Acknowledgment, CONCORD HOSP. [hereinafter
Treatment Authorization], https://www.giaofnh.com/UploadedFiles/Files/CHTreatmentAuthorizationAd
ministrativeAcknowledgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AVP-7SK8] (Dec. 1, 2017).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
11. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of New Hampshire, Former
Employee of Exeter Hospital Pleads Guilty to Charges Related to Multi-State Hepatitis C Outbreak,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nh/pr/former-employee-exeter-hospital-pleads-guilty-charges-relatedmulti-state-hepatitis-c [https://perma.cc/PS8R-3GBZ] (Apr. 10, 2015).
12. Id.
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carried by [the employee].13
This sort of conduct by hospital employees is not unique to New
Hampshire.14 Reflecting on this and the contract form that I had been
presented with, it seemed to me that hospitals and hospital systems
would have even more control over dangerous employees than the
independent contractors that the contract appeared to worry about. But
those third parties may not be subject to the same oversight, based on
my understanding of the differences between contractors and
employees.15
I looked up at the somewhat surprised, increasingly impatient intake
administrator, who was waiting for me to sign the contract and move
along, and the following dialogue ensued:
I said, “Well, I’m fine with the first few paragraphs, but I don’t like
the last one, the one that seems to ask me to waive rights with regard
to people who work for you. Can we strike it?”
She blanched a little at this, becoming just a little more rigid, and
responded, “No. You have to sign or you have to decline.”
“Who are these third-party independent contractors? Do you know
them? Do they work here? Are they good at what they do?”
“I don’t know. It’s just a form.”
13. Id. As it turned out, a third-party contractor placed the “employee” at the hospital, where the
employee previously worked as a contractor before being hired full-time. See Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Am.
Healthcare Servs. Ass’n, 172 A.3d 1043, 1046–47 (N.H. 2017) (describing how the staffing agency
screened and placed temporary worker at hospital before he was hired full-time).
14. News reflects the range of helpful and harmful people who may hold such positions within hospital
systems, even as employees. See, e.g., Caroline Reinwald, Former Hospital Worker Accused of
Intentionally Spoiling Vaccine Vials Arrested, WMUR9, https://www.wmur.com/article/vaccinesintentionally-removed-from-refrigerator-at-grafton-hospital/35105546 [https://perma.cc/46MB-YLZX]
(Jan. 1, 2021, 11:34 AM) (describing how a hospital employee tampered with COVID-19 vaccines).
15. See Criteria to Establish an Employee or Independent Contractor, N.H. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.nh.gov/labor/documents/employee-contractor-poster.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88T2-47AB]
(Feb. 1, 2018) (indicating an independent contractor is not subject to the same extent of control as an
employee, as a matter of law).
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“Ok. Is there someone you can call to find out?”
“No.”
“No one?”
“No.”
“Can I pay extra to have this paragraph stricken?”
“No. You can either sign or decline.”
“Is there someone you can call to check on that?”
“No.”
“But I may want the stuff in the first two paragraphs. If I don’t sign
this, will you still see me?”
“Yes.”
“Ok. I guess I’ll decline. Do you know if my healthcare privacy is
still protected if I don’t sign?”
“I don’t.”
And so, I declined to sign. Instead, I had my physical, but I did so
by taking risks around healthcare privacy that other patients could
contract to augment. I did not and could not do that because I did not
want to give up rights against the hospital for the negligence of third
parties that the hospital hired that I did not know and that the agent
proposing the terms could not describe.
I am sure the situation will not surprise the readers of this Article at
all because this situation is so common for so many readers, who are

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss2/9
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also patients. In sum, my doctors had presented me with a “contract”
that I (a) did not understand (who were these third parties doing
business with the hospital and why did the hospital need to extract a
waiver?) and (b) could not negotiate to augment my rights for my
benefit.
The reason I could not negotiate was because (a) the platform for
contracting would not permit it, and (b) the agent offering it did not
appear capable of negotiation on her end, very likely because of
institutional reasons limiting her discretion. 16
For the purpose of this Article, the interesting feature of this
experience was that the form presented at the provider’s office had
been ported over to a much more mutable transactional interface—an
electronic contract presented on a tablet. Afterward, while waiting for
the doctor to take my blood pressure, I reflected further on the
experience and wondered, “Why is that platform so resistant to
negotiation?”
These thoughts gave birth to this Article and to discussions not only
between myself and the first-year law students whom I teach contracts
and sales to as an adjunct professor at the University of New
Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law and Vermont Law School,
but also to discussions with attorneys practicing in fields ranging from
healthcare, energy, consumer protection, and blockchain technology.17
Perhaps to me, but not, at least, to my students who increasingly were

16. An astute colleague who has served as the general counsel for a hospital system responded to this
Article by noting that the situation did provide me with the possibility of not accepting the terms and still
getting the physical. To this observation, I asked her how many people she thought took the route I had
taken. She hypothesized no greater than one percent. Given this answer, I think it is safe to assume that
the hospital system (not the one my colleague worked for) and its attorneys know this. Their de facto
expectation is that patients will scan the text, do very little to understand it, and sign their rights away
when presented with the threshold experience of getting through the registration process. This experience,
even if it permits an opt-out option, does very little to alleviate the capacity problem this Article seeks to
address. In any case, the anecdote is presented as an example of a form that could be negotiated but is not
negotiable in a situation regarding health and well-being where, as I thought about it, the contract
presented to me compromised my well-being. See Treatment Authorization, supra note 7.
17. Michael Lewis, UNIV. OF N.H. FRANKLIN PIERCE SCH. OF L., https://law.unh.edu/person/michaellewis
[https://perma.cc/WQ5L-KDRD];
Michael
Lewis,
VT.
L.
SCH.,
https://www.vermontlaw.edu/directory/person/lewis-michael [https://perma.cc/CF4L-HNBU].
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“born digital,”18 it is a wonderment of modern word processing that
electronic platforms provide for the sort of editing that was
unthinkable in the age of the typewriter. 19 It would defy credibility to
argue that converting the document, which the hospital presented me,
into a format that could be altered in ways subject to a greater level of
precision and tailoring in negotiation, was outside the ken of modern
technology two decades into the twenty-first century.20 So, I thought:
Does this technology not provide an opportunity to reconceive a
ruleset in the area of consumer contracts that would solve some of my
concerns regarding the dilemma of pervasive adult incapacity in the
area of electronic contracts?21 The more I thought about it, the more I
thought that it does.
I concluded that such a ruleset should draw upon the law of torts,
which defines protections that the law confers to protect consumers
from dangerous consumer goods. Tort law requires that consumer
safety be protected through the imposition of rules that require the
marketplace to keep up, at least, with available technology as it
becomes safer for people to use and more pervasive within the
marketplace.22 As an example, cars must now have seatbelts and
airbags to protect people from injuries that they would otherwise suffer
from if cars did not have these types of protections.23 Tort law demands
18. See generally JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES (1st ed. 2008) (coining the phrase with regard to children born into
and raised in the digital world and discussing the special circumstances and features of growing up in the
digital age).
19. See generally LEAH A. PLUNKETT, SHARENTHOOD: WHY WE SHOULD THINK BEFORE WE TALK
ABOUT OUR KIDS ONLINE (2019) (discussing the special challenges facing those not born digital who are
responsible for those who have been).
20. See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 1 (2019) (“Information technologies are
highly configurable, and their configurability offers multiple points of entry for interested and
well-resourced parties to shape their development.”); see also WILLIAM MAGNUSON, BLOCKCHAIN
DEMOCRACY, at vii (2020) (“As the nineteenth century belongs to literature, and the twentieth to war, the
twenty-first century belongs to technology.”).
21. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 135 (2017)
(“[T]he platform is not simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a new infrastructural
formation . . . . [but a] core organizational form of the emerging informational economy.”).
22. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 286
(2008) (“In assessing a defendant’s conduct, courts presume that a defendant who fails to comply with
safety-related customs prevalent in her industry acts negligently.”).
23. Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (2017)
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that car manufacturers bear the expense to keep us all safe. 24 Why not
demand the same of electronic contracts by updating forms like the
one the hospital presented me? Why not think about how the law can
create “seatbelts” for the drivers of dangerous contracts?
As it stands, that form otherwise proceeded, in archaic fashion,
through more mutable and dynamic technology that (a) presented me
with a deal I did not like in a fashion that I argue renders me incapable
and (b) threatened to injure me by depriving me of remedies I would
purchase or have purchased through technology that could be rendered
better and safer for me—all in the context of an experience liminal to
a fundamental and personal healthcare moment.
What kind of technology, however, would make me capable and
return contract law to intelligibility by creating recordable events that
would serve as a better proxy for capable assent? Rather than
defaulting to technology indicating “notice,” I argue that technology
that may be negotiated at a more engaged level provides the key to this
dilemma. Negotiation and evidence of negotiation provide a stronger
indication of engagement, agency, mindfulness, and mutuality in the
exchange of rights rather than one-way dictation.25
(“We draw an analogy to self-driving or autonomous cars. Just as a passenger in a self-driving car relies
on the car to determine optimal means (direction, speed, lane choice) to travel between two locations and
to update its determination to account for real-time contingencies (traffic, weather, construction), the
parties to a self-driving contract agree to a shared goal and trust in the contract to direct them on precisely
how to achieve that goal in light of real-time contingencies.”). See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom,
When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293 (2018) (discussing
the development of tort liability and updates to safety standards supplied by tort law and statutory law in
anticipation of a new regime governing autonomous cars).
24. See Sugarman, supra note 4, at 573–74 (discussing the concept of risk and loss spreading theories
and use of common law to engage in the process of insuring society against acute injuries suffered by
some).
25. See Jon Linkov, How to Negotiate a New Car-Price Effectively, CONSUMER REPS.,
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-pricing-negotiation/how-to-negotiate-a-new-car-price-effectively/
[https://perma.cc/KR9L-8KF9] (July 26, 2021) (“Negotiating . . . might feel comical—like pitting an
amateur against a team of professionals. But by setting the ground rules early, you can level the playing
field.”). Compare Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, Designing and Enforcing Preliminary Agreements,
98 TEX. L. REV. 439, 446 (2020) (describing contracts in which more substantial negotiation among and
between parties will still not yield an enforceable agreement among and between businesses), with OREN
BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 2
(2012) (“Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their
customers.”). Consumers purchasing cars from dealers should negotiate one thing at a time and not accept
package deals. See Linkov, supra (“Instead, insist on negotiating one thing at a time. Your first priority is
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At an even more general level, the concept of negotiation is akin to
navigability, where modern contracting has placed the consumer at the
labyrinthian disposal of corporate counterparties.26 Right now,
consumers are in the maze, and the solution that the law provides is to
tell them they are in the maze. For instance, the Tentative Draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Consumer Contracts acknowledges that
consumers are lost but imposes “blanket assent” on consumers to the
contract terms because technological interface provides them of notice
of the terms.27 This Article rejects that position and attempts to provide
a better and more credible solution. 28
In Part I of this Article, I reassert my previous claims about how the
adult-consumer-contracting environment renders adults incapable as
the concept of capacity is most credibly conceptualized.29 In Part II, I
explore the solution to this problem by analyzing a recent decision by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court involving the contracting
platform supplied by Uber.30 Further, Part II argues that the decision
signals movement toward the solution that this Article advances.31 I
claim that it does so by permitting parties to argue that available
technology indicating a firm’s capacity to facilitate greater consumer
engagement with a transaction creates a minimum threshold for
facilitating behavior, signaling the manifestation of assent.32 But, in
to settle on the lowest price you can get on the new vehicle. Only after you’ve locked that in should you
begin to discuss a trade-in or financing, [if necessary].”).
26. COHEN, supra note 20, at 39 (describing the historical development of this phenomenon, including
identifying twentieth century advertising as “[t]he era of the mass audience. . . in which the legibility
rubric supplied by an intermediary became both an object of regularized economic exchange and an
increasingly powerful, institutionalized arbiter of the knowledge upon which market participants relied”).
27. Lewis, supra note 1, at 103–05 (describing the ALI’s tentative draft); Plunkett & Lewis, supra
note 3, at 17 (discussing same); Mark E. Budnitz, The Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts:
The American Law Institute’s Impossible Dream, 32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 369, 370 (2020) (critiquing
the ALI’s adoption of “blanket assent” as a concept that “creates a presumption that consumers conducting
transactions . . . will be bound to standard contract terms”).
28. This Article adopts the definition of consumer contracts relied upon by the ALI in its Restatement
of the Law, Consumer Contracts. “Consumer contracts” are contracts other than employment contracts
that individuals enter into with businesses when individuals are acting primarily for personal, family, and
household purposes. See RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: CONSUMER CONTS. § 1(a)(4) (AM. L. INST., Tentative
Draft No.8, 2019).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part II.
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this Part, I maintain that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
falls short of complete conceptual intelligibility by suggesting a
threshold for manifesting assent that does not provide a credible test
for establishing mutual assent through a capable consumer
counterparty.33 I then use well-trodden gaming technology from the
online sports gambling platform supplied by DraftKings, among other
domains, to further demonstrate this point and to present how available
technology provides far greater negotiability capabilities that are now
possible in the consumer marketplace.34
Part III asserts that negotiable technology demonstrated by the
DraftKings platform indicates that recognition of greater capacity to
negotiate between consumers and sellers should be imported into the
law of consumer contracts, as a threshold matter, where other solutions
have proved incapable of resolving the central problem facing
consumer contracts.35 The central problem is that consumers have been
or could be deemed to assent to terms they do not and cannot
understand, foisted upon them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without
even leaving them with a mechanism to buy their way out of this
conundrum.36 Part III further argues that the same consumer welfare
arguments that merit the imposition of safer technology for those who
drive cars with seatbelts support default rules that encourage and
promote safe technology around the documents that facilitate such
purchases in e-commerce.
I. RETURNING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
The concept of a contract is valuable on numerous grounds that give
the concept definition, separate and apart from torts and criminal law;
for instance, where our conduct is governed by standards derived from
public processes.37 As a field of conceptual inquiry, contract law is
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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distinct from these other subject fields because it defines and “governs
the voluntary, consensual series of acts and decisions that cause people
to engage with each other for a specific, mutually beneficial
purpose.”38 This distinguishing feature exists “if both parties to a
contract (or all parties) . . . act with volition and provide assent.”39 In
other words, “[t]he underlying and essential elements in a contractual
relationship are [1] that two or more autonomous individuals with
capacity [2] voluntarily agree (consent) to be bound by [3] some
mutually bargained for benefit or trade (exchange).”40
The closer the law adheres to these requirements, the likelier the law
of contracts will assure that those agreements limiting agency are
accomplished at a level of agency and that rational understanding
consistent with a strong commitment to individual liberty that this
definition projects.41 The risks and implications of permitting slippage
from this standard are well stated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who
once wrote in regard to the proper application of contract law and its
demands: “We are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at
the mercy of the other.”42

“recognizing or classifying particular cases as instances of general terms, and in the case of everything
which we are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central cases, where it certainly
applies and others where there are reasons for both asserting and denying that it applies”); see also SCOTT
J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 13 (2011) (“Conceptual analysis can easily be thought of as . . . detective
work. . . . In conceptual analysis, the philosopher also collects clues and uses the process of elimination
for a specific purpose, namely, to elucidate the identity of the entity that falls under the concept in
question.”).
38. Lewis, supra note 1, at 86 (describing the concept of the contract).
39. Id.
40. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 219–20
(2004).
41. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 50 (1974) (“A person’s shaping his life in
accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity
to so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life.”).
42. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (first citing Hearn v. Stevens
& Bro., 97 N.Y.S. 566, 569–70 (App. Div. 1906); and then citing Russell v. Allerton, 15 N.E. 391 (N.Y.
1888)); see also Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983)
(acknowledging that “paternalism” may be appropriate “to protect the weaker party” to a contract); PHILIP
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52–54 (1997) (describing freedom
dependent upon a state’s capacity to eliminate power imbalances that permit one party to dominate
another). But see State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627, 629–30 (Minn. 2021) (reversing guilty verdict for
defendant convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct on grounds of statute defining mental
capacity with reference to victim’s participation in conduct leading to incapacitation).
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The independence of contract law as conceptualized bears a strong,
genealogical relationship to liberal theorists who created the
foundation for our liberal democracy.43 Liberal democratic
revolutionaries grounded justified government action on an adult’s
standing as a free-thinker capable of rationally bargaining one’s
natural freedom away to society in exchange for the benefits of a
cooperative life in society.44
Professor Charles Fried, a leading late twentieth and early
twenty-first century contract theorist, reprised this perspective for
contemporary times, stating, “It is a first principle of liberal political

43. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 42 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co., 1980) (1690) (“G[od], having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good
for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive
him into society, as well as fitted him with the understanding and language to continue to enjoy it.”); see
also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in UTILITARIANISM AND ON LIBERTY:
INCLUDING MILL’S ‘ESSAY ON BENTHAM’ AND SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
AND JOHN AUSTIN 88, 96 (Mary Warnock ed., Blackwell Publ’g Ltd. 2d ed. 2003) (“But there is a sphere
of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only indirect interest;
comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also
affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation.”); HOLLY
BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, & THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN
AUTHORITY 8 (2005) (“The concept of an ‘age of reason’ became critical for determining who could give
meaningful consent. . . . The changing status of childhood was a consequence of this emphasis on an age
of reason, which arose as part of the new basis for political legitimacy.”). But see H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY AND MORALITY 32–33 (1963) (“No doubt if we no longer sympathise with [Mill’s criticism of
paternalism] this is due, in part, to a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests
best, and to an increased awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be
attached to an apparently free choice or to consent. . . . Underlying Mill’s extreme fear of paternalism
there perhaps is a conception of what a normal human being is like which now seems not to correspond
to the facts.”).
44. See LOCKE, supra note 43, at 52 (“M[en] being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without
his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties,
and a greater security against any, that are not of it.”); see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 26 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., The Univ. of N.C. Press 1980) (1973)
(“‘It is certain, in theory,’ John Adams wrote in May 1776, ‘that the only moral foundation of government
is, the consent of the people. But to what an extent shall we carry this principle?’”); JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: WITH GENEVA
TRANSCRIPT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 41, 110 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St.
Martin’s Press, Inc. 1978) (“There is only one law that, by its nature, requires unanimous consent. That is
the social compact. For civil association is the most voluntary act in the world. Since every man is born
free and master of himself, no one, under any pretext whatever, can subject him without his consent. To
decide that the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man.” (footnote omitted)).
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morality that we be secure in what is ours—so that our persons and
property not be open to exploitation by others, and that from a sure
foundation we may express our will and expend our powers in the
world.”45 For Fried, freedom rests upon a system that permits a person
to be left alone to accomplish what his capacities permit and to suffer
the responsibility of failures arising from free, active, and personal
choice.46 Fried described this as the “liberal ideal.”47
In a similar vein, Philip Pettit has shaped a theory of republicanism
around the notion that government power should, at the least, serve to
broker relationships such that people are not subject to power
dynamics that facilitate one party’s domination of another through the
deployment of arbitrary authority. 48 His definition of coercion includes
manipulation, which he describes as “usually covert and may take the
form of agenda-fixing, the deceptive or non-rational shaping of
people’s beliefs or desires, or the rigging of the consequences of

45. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7 (2d ed.
2015).
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 7; see also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 2 (1978) (“Central to this account is the
individual’s capacity to choose freely and effectively, to choose between right and wrong.”); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 35 (2013)
(“The traditional liberal understanding of freedom of contract portrays individual freedom as effectuated
by individual voluntary agreements, with the concomitant understanding that unfreedom will thereby be
avoided.”). Professor Randy Barnett’s “consent theory” is a modification of this principle but is no less
committed to the notion that evidence of capable individual agreement stands at the heart of a workable
system of contract law. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
304 (1986) (arguing that “consent” rather than “intent” or “will” provides the best theoretical basis for a
justifiable theory of contract law). P.S. Atiyah contests these accounts within the United Kingdom and
has argued that reliance and unjust enrichment theories of contract law explain contract theory rather than
these models. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 4 (reprt. 1985) (1979)
(“Much of this book is based on the conviction that this traditional attitude to promise-based obligations
is misconceived, and that the grounds for the imposition of such liabilities are, by the standards of modern
values, very weak compared with the grounds for the creation of benefit-based and reliance-based
obligations.”).
48. PETTIT, supra note 42, at 52 (defining relationships of domination as a product of a parties’
capacity to arbitrarily interfere with the choices of others); cf. WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE:
MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN CULTURE, at xv (1993) (“[T]he culture of consumer
capitalism may have been among the most nonconsensual public cultures ever created, and it was
nonconsensual for two reasons. First, it was not produced by ‘the people’ but by commercial groups in
cooperation with other elites comfortable with and committed to making profits and to accumulating
capital on an ever-ascending scale. Second, it was nonconsensual because, in its mere day-to-day conduct
(but not in any conspiratorial way), it raised to the fore only one vision of the good life and pushed out all
others.”).
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people’s actions.”49 To take the contrary position would require a
theorist to defend the exercise of power as a matter of public policy,
within a government embracing republicanism, on theories that also
would accept domination and manipulation of the sort Pettit
disclaims.50 This Article adopts a critical approach aligned with
Pettit’s perspective.51 It grounds the concept of contract capacity in a
more credible formulation: one that embraces the perspectives on
freedom and autonomy supplied by Professor Fried and Pettit.52 This
Article is therefore critical of a contract law formulation that amounts
to a dictation of legal rights to individuals by private,
multi-jurisdictional business actors with immense scale and
unprecedented advantages with respect to concentrated wealth and
experience in a series of business domains.53
This Article criticizes an area of law that some might dismiss as
mundane—the area of consumer contracting.54 That area, however
mundane, touches the lives of millions of people throughout the world,
49. PETTIT, supra note 42, at 53.
50. Cf. GÉRALDINE SCHWARZ, THOSE WHO FORGET: MY FAMILY’S STORY IN NAZI EUROPE—A
MEMOIR, A HISTORY, A WARNING 2–3 (Laura Marris trans., Scribner 2020) (2017) (“But in the aftermath
of the war, no one, or almost no one, in Germany, asked themselves what might have happened if the
majority of citizens had not followed the current, but instead turned against a politics that had revealed
relatively early its intention to crush human dignity under its heel.”).
51. Cf. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 8 (2020) (“A researcher
investigating any specific question picks one set of beginning assumptions, or another, or perhaps another
(each consistent with some more basic underlying presumptions, like purposeful human behavior).”).
52. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 114–16 (challenging the presumption of capacity applied to adults
through a reformulation of capacity that takes environmental restrictions on consumer performance into
consideration).
53. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018) (“Respondents Wayfair,
Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., are merchants with no employees or real estate in South
Dakota. Wayfair, Inc., is a leading online retailer of home goods and furniture and had net revenues of
over $4.7 billion last year. Overstock.com, Inc., is one of the top online retailers in the United States,
selling a wide variety of products from home goods and furniture to clothing and jewelry; and it had net
revenues of over $1.7 billion last year. Newegg, Inc., is a major online retailer of consumer electronics in
the United States. Each of these three companies ships its goods directly to purchasers throughout the
United States, including South Dakota. Each easily meets the minimum sales or transactions requirement
of the Act, but none collects South Dakota sales tax.” (citing State v. Wayfair, Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 759–
60 (S.D. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018))).
54. So much of the air of the room with regard to law is being absorbed by public law questions,
including, of late, those related to the continued existence of a constitutional republic in the aftermath of
the Trump presidency. See, e.g., David French, Trump’s Acquittal Exposed a Republic in Peril, TIME
(Feb. 16, 2021, 3:27 PM), https://time.com/5939806/donald-trump-impeachment-acquittal-democracy/
[https://perma.cc/2DMC-FE68] (discussing how the Trump presidency exposed flaws in the current
American system of government).
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day in and day out.55 It is the venue where we consumers are repeatedly
presented with language implicating and describing our legal rights.
The aggregate impact of these transactions on American society
recently drew the New York Times editorial board to weigh in on the
phenomenon in a piece titled, What Happens When You Click
‘Agree’?56
The New York Times editorial board commented on Amazon’s terms
of service: “[M]ost people have no idea what is signed away when they
click ‘agree’ to binding terms of service contracts—again and again on
phones, laptops, tablets, watches, e-readers and televisions.”57 They
asserted that the drafters of such terms “feel emboldened to insert
terms that advantage them at their customers’ expense” and that
customers would not “knowingly agree” to such terms.58 The terms to
which consumers are said to “agree” have ballooned in length and
complexity, with some extending to Shakespearean play-length.59
The “emboldened” position of these giants of commerce, the New
York Times described, is a product of their power and status.60 As one
scholar has noted:
A few giant corporations, easily countable on a single hand,
dominate the tech industry to an extent rarely before seen in
the history of capitalism. Their names are familiar to us all:
Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google. Their
dominance is remarkable. Social media is Facebook. Online
search is Google. Online shopping is Amazon. Apple and
55. See David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers,
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2016) (“Contracting has never flourished more than it does today.
Consumers see a larger number of contracts daily than they used to, with longer terms and under novel
conditions.”).
56. Editorial Board, Opinion, What Happens when You Click ‘Agree’?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/opinion/sunday/online-terms-of-service.html
[https://perma.cc/DG96-M5T5].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (observing that online contracts contain more words than the play Julius Caesar); see also
ALEC MACGILLIS, FULFILLMENT: WINNING AND LOSING IN ONE-CLICK AMERICA 10 (2021) (“Put most
simply, business activity that used to be dispersed across hundreds of companies large and small, whether
in media or retail or finance, was increasingly dominated by a handful of giant firms.”).
60. Editorial Board, supra note 56.
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Netflix have competitors, but they still manage to exert
unrivaled control over their industries. These companies rule
technology and, consequently, our lives. One cannot partake
in the wonders of modern technology without going through
them. Technology is, in a word, centralized. 61
Control of this sort requires subjects. Its subjects are us.62 This
Article argues, as others have, that as subjects to this control, we are
debased.63
This Article embraces, rather than rejects, the foundations of
free-market economic principles. Indeed, consigning consumers to
standing of the sort acknowledged by the New York Times is
inconsistent with what Adam Smith envisioned when he laid the
philosophical framework for the normative superiority of a liberal, free
market economy.64 Smith saw the marketplace as a source of
individual empowerment and not as the reestablishment of structures
of domination and centralized control. 65 Concerns over the extent to
which firms use what they call contracts to move the free market away
from Smith’s conception are central to this Article’s focus.
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT’S RECENT

61. MAGNUSON, supra note 20, at vii.
62. See Rage Against the Machine, Killing in the Name, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWXazVhlyxQ [https://perma.cc/Y6EV-8JHH] (“And now you do
what they told ya—now you’re under control!”).
63. See DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN, ABSENTEES: ON VARIOUSLY MISSING PERSONS 8 (2021)
(describing how persons may be rendered nonpersons when “their rights and prerogatives are reduced to
the point at which their social, legal, and civil personalities may be nullified”); see also Danielle Allen,
The Road from Serfdom, in THE AMERICAN CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG. HOW WE RECOVER 452, 459
(Cullen Murphy ed., 2020) (“No one wants to feel buffeted in this way—subject to, and at the mercy of,
the will of powerful others, to whom they are invisible. There’s a word we can use to describe [this]
condition . . . . The word is serfdom.”).
64. Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 5 (2017) (“On his account, a successful bargain requires each to
consider how they could bring some advantage to the other. Without a sympathetic appreciation for what
might interest the other in transacting with oneself, and without acknowledging the independent standing
of the other as someone whose property rights must be respected, no bargain will be struck. Smith, no less
than Marx, reviled selfishness as a basis for relating to others.” (footnote omitted)).
65. See id. at 1–5.
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EFFORTS TO RESTORE INTELLIGIBILITY TO CONTRACT LAW
Helpfully, the phenomenon I discuss in this Article arose, very
recently, in a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
That decision lays the groundwork for the solutions this Article
proposes. In Kauders v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,66 the court concluded
that “Uber’s terms and conditions did not constitute a contract with the
plaintiffs” because the “app’s registration process did not provide users
with reasonable notice of the terms and conditions and did not obtain
a clear manifestation of assent to the terms, both of which could have
been easily achieved.”67
In drawing this conclusion, the court marched readers through the
numerous features of Uber’s app that facilitate consumer interaction. 68
Those features included fields designed to collect the consumer’s
contact and billing information that the court noted facilitate Uber’s
business in a manner eminently navigable to the consumer. 69
According to the court’s rendition, the consumer enters an email
address, telephone number, and password.70 The consumer then
creates a profile.71 The consumer enters default payment
information.72 Finally, the consumer clicks “DONE,” creating the
consumer’s account.73 This technological design, in the court’s view,
makes it easy for the consumer to move through Uber’s registration
process.74
According to the court, “in remarkable contrast,” the terms and
conditions containing waiver of rights provisions on the same platform
“are obscured in the registration process.”75 At the bottom of the
payment screen, white text states, “By creating an Uber account, you

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

159 N.E.3d 1033 (Mass. 2021).
Id. at 1039.
See id. at 1039–40.
Id. (describing Uber’s registration process).
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1040.
Id.
See id. at 1039–40.
Id. at 1039.
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agree to the Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy.”76 By clicking
on the white text, the user is “taken to a screen that contained other
clickable buttons, labeled ‘Terms & Conditions’ and ‘Privacy
Policy.’”77 Clicking those buttons reveals the text of these
provisions.78
In the court’s words, “[t]he terms and conditions contain numerous
provisions, many of which are extremely favorable to Uber[,]”
including a “broad limitation of liability provision.”79 “This provision
purports to release Uber from all liability for”:
ANY INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL
OR
OTHER
DAMAGES OF ANY TYPE OR KIND (INCLUDING
PERSONAL INJURY, LOSS OF DATA, REVENUE,
PROFITS, USE OR OTHER ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE).
[UBER] SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS,
DAMAGE OR INJURY WHICH MAY BE INCURRED
BY YOU . . . . YOU EXPRESSLY WAIVE AND
RELEASE [UBER] FROM ANY AND ALL ANY [sic]
LIABILITY, CLAIMS OR DAMAGES ARISING FROM
OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE THIRD PARTY
TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER.80
The court described Uber’s terms and conditions as “extensive and
far reaching, touching on a wide variety of topics.”81 It included
waivers of liability both generally and specifically with regard to the
conduct of Uber drivers, described as “THIRD PARTY
TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER[S].”82
The terms imposed indemnification responsibilities on the user for
any breach of the terms or, amorphously, for any breach of “any
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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applicable law or regulation . . . .”83 Further, the terms even bound
users to future, unstated amendments to the terms not in existence at
the time the user registered.84 Users thus would be bound to mandatory
arbitration for all disputes arising from or relating to the agreement
containing the terms.85 The agreement’s format leaves no room for
negotiation with respect to its terms. The court noted that this approach
is common within the domain of “similar online contracts.”86
In assessing whether the terms and conditions were binding as a
matter of contract law, the court concluded that “the fundamentals of
online contract formation should not be different from ordinary
contract formation.”87 For the court, contract formation in this case
turned on the test of whether the device at issue gave “reasonable
notice of the terms and a reasonable manifestation of assent to those
terms.”88
“Reasonable notice” exists where the user reviews the terms or
“somehow interact[s] with the terms before agreeing to them.”89 In
internet contracts, “the specifics and subtleties of the ‘design and
content of the relevant interface’ are especially relevant in evaluating
whether reasonable notice has been provided.”90 Clarity and simplicity
of the terms’ communication are benchmarks of reasonable notice.
“Does the interface require the user to open the terms or make them
readily available? How many steps must be taken to access the terms
and conditions, and how clear and extensive is the process to access
the terms?”91 As a general matter, the court’s analysis fails to provide
clear answers to these questions.

83. Id. at 1042.
84. See Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1041, 1042.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1042 n.13 (citing numerous law review articles on topic of online contracts).
87. Id. at 1048 (citing Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2016)).
88. Id. at 1049 (first citing Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 611–12 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013),
aff’d, 84 N.E.3d 766 (Mass. 2017); then citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.
2012); and then citing Kevin Conroy & John Shope, Look Before You Click: The Enforceability of Website
and Smartphone App Terms and Conditions, BOS. BAR J., Spring 2019, at 23, 23)).
89. Id.
90. Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1050 (first quoting Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir.
2017); and then citing Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016)).
91. Id. (citing Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2018)).
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In the court’s view, regardless of what will ultimately pass muster
as an enforceable contract, the design of the Uber website “enables, if
not encourages, users to ignore the terms and conditions.”92 From this
observation, the court concluded that users may reasonably believe
that they are signing up for a ride with Uber for a price, not a wholesale
waiver of a series of other important legal rights set forth in the terms
and conditions that are implicated if the user suffered some sort of
injury.93
“Reasonable notice” is just one step in the analysis. An enforceable
contract must also give rise to a “reasonable manifestation of
assent . . . .”94 To pass this gauntlet, the court discusses some specific
actions it would require of companies like Uber to ensure consumers
manifest assent.95 With regard to the minimum threshold the court
imposed upon Uber, the Kauders court commented:
Requiring a user to expressly and affirmatively assent to the
terms, such as by indicating “I Agree” or its equivalent,
serves several important purposes. It puts the user on notice
that the user is entering into a contractual arrangement. This
is particularly important regarding online services, where
services may be provided without requiring compensation or
contractual agreements, and the users may not be
sophisticated commercial actors. Without an action
comparable to the solemnity of physically signing a written
contract, for example, we are concerned such users may not
be aware of the implications of their actions where
agreement to terms is not expressly required. 96
The failure of the Uber platform to require any more affirmative
indication of agreement beyond signing up for the service fell short of

92. Id. at 1053 (citing Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035).
93. Id. at 1041 (agreeing with trial court’s observation that the “provision ‘totally extinguishes any
possible remedy’”).
94. Id. at 1049.
95. Id. at 1050.
96. Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1050–51 (citing Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035).
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the court’s standard.97 The court invalidated the terms and conditions,
including the mandatory arbitration clause it contained, and the
plaintiffs were able to proceed with their lawsuit, which included a
claim under Massachusetts disability law.98
The decision signals a split in jurisdictions over online contract
formation. As recently as 2017, the Second Circuit, applying similar
constructs, ruled that a similar Uber contract passed muster in terms of
the law of contract formation.99 There, the decision stipulated that the
user did not read the terms and conditions and did not click through
any specific website function in order to manifest assent in the manner
demanded by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.100 Following
the Seventh Circuit’s lead in a series of high-profile cases, the Second
Circuit nevertheless enforced the terms and conditions against the user
as a matter of contract. 101 The ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court therefore appears as a salve to consumer rights activists
hoping to salvage legal rights for consumers like the litigants in
Kauders.102
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1039, 1054–55; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98A (West, Westlaw through
Chapter 29 of the 2021 1st Annual Session) (entitling blind people accompanied by a “dog guide” with
the same accommodations to which sighted people are entitled). For a further discussion of this case, see
Mark E. Budnitz, A Rose Is a Rose: Electronic Commerce Spawns Word Confusion, GA. ST. U. L. REV.
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2021), https://gsulawreview.org/post/1111-a-rose-is-a-rose-electronic-commerce-spawnsword-confusion [https://perma.cc/5M2B-FC6X], where the article discusses how Kauders’s precedential
value is compromised because “a company’s website design may change often. Consequently, a court
could find that a website design initially met the legal requirements for containing the consumer’s assent,
but the website could later be found to be insufficient if the design is changed in a material way.”
99. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017). The Meyer court expressed
the following:
Although Meyer’s assent to arbitration was not express, we are convinced it was
unambiguous in light of the objectively reasonable notice of the terms . . . .
The fact that clicking the register button had two functions—creation of the user
account and assent to the Terms of Service—does not render Meyer’s assent
ambiguous.
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 71.
101. See id. at 75, 79; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding shrinkwrap license on computer box enforceable and noting two-party contracts may be enforced
outright); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding arbitration clause
on computer box enforceable against consumer because consumer did not return computer within thirty
days).
102. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Considering Uber Technologies Inc v Heller Under US Law, 1
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But the victory is a small one when considering the very low
threshold that the Kauders decision appears to set. Assume Uber brings
itself into compliance with the court’s order. Assume Uber and others
make their terms and conditions one or two layers more accessible to
the consumer. Assume Uber and others require consumers to click “I
Agree” to those terms. Uber’s form would still present users with terms
and conditions that they are unlikely to understand or properly evaluate
and, for those few who do, are unable to alter or negotiate.103
In other words, having analyzed the question through the traditional
prism of reasonable notice and manifestation of assent, the Second
Circuit failed to set a default position for the next case that will
meaningfully impact the dynamic between Uber and its users. Even if,
Uber and others apply what the Kauders court suggests will pass
muster, consumers will still remain subject to opaque legal terms set
unilaterally by repeat actors holding the keys to entry under a set of
default rules that permit Uber and others to spread those terms
throughout the market and limit the capacity of American citizens to
obtain judicial relief for violations of the ADA and other statutes.104
I have argued that courts should permit litigants to challenge the
devices deployed by Uber at an even more basic stage: the stage of
capacity.105 Relying on a more persuasive definition of capacity, one
that considers both the internal capabilities of parties and the ways in
which domains permit or prevent parties to demonstrate those
capabilities, I have argued that the current environment of consumer

CAN. J. COM. ARB. 163 (2020) (describing how the Canadian Supreme Court invalidated Uber’s
mandatory arbitration clause by applying the Canadian doctrine of unconscionability and analyzing U.S.
cases that have challenged Uber’s mandatory arbitration clause).
103. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TOO MUCH INFORMATION: UNDERSTANDING WHAT YOU DON’T WANT TO
KNOW 17 (2020) (“Much information does not enable people to do anything at all.”). Sunstein approaches
the question from the view that information either assists or fails to assist in decision-making, which
assumes that one has the power to make a meaningful decision with information. See id. at 21 (“Under
circumstances of poverty, deprivation, or discrimination, people might not have an interest in obtaining
important information, and they might not have the capacity to get it even if they do have interest.”).
104. See Hila Keren, Separating Church and Market: The Duty to Secure Market Citizenship for All,
U.C.
IRVINE
L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
5),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3788309
[https://perma.cc/9G65-M2PX]
(observing how private law can undermine or buttress the status of citizens under our laws).
105. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 78–79.
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contracting renders consumers pervasively incapacitated. 106 It presents
them with forms they do not and will not read or understand and could
not alter even if they tried.
This sort of arrangement, generally speaking, constitutes a
day-in-and-day-out form of citizen domination by larger commercial
actors that undermines their legal rights and standing, which in turn,
undermines republicanism, a form of society that this Article adopts as
a healthier and better form of existence. 107 This arrangement subjects
citizens to a consumer culture of domination that discourages them
from having a hand in the protection and definition of legal rights that
define our legal identities. 108 Tracing the history of this development,
one commentator stated that at the dawn of the twenty-first century,
the United States had become “a place . . . where consumerism ha[s]
so subsumed citizenship that it in fact became it.”109 Framed with this
in mind, it is fair to argue that our fates, as citizens, are now subject to
the dominance and direction of large entities able to create a de facto
legal regime through contracting practices that permit an end run
around public, republican processes.
As a result, we are injured in our capacity as citizens if one takes
seriously the importance of the rights citizens possess under American
106. See id. at 105–17 (discussing the factors that lead to an environment where consumers do not have
the capacity to engage in modern contracts). Leading scholars have said as much without following their
conclusions through to doctrinal conclusions around contracting capacity. See BAR-GILL, supra note 25,
at 18 (“[The] rational consumer navigates complexity with ease . . . . The imperfectly rational consumer,
[which is all of us], is less capable of such an accurate assessment . . . . [and] is unable to calculate prices
that are indirectly specified through complex formulas.”).
107. See infra Part III.
108. See MICHAEL TOMASKY, IF WE CAN KEEP IT: HOW THE REPUBLIC COLLAPSED AND HOW IT
MIGHT BE SAVED 124 (2019) (“We go through life wearing many identities. . . . But in terms of our public
rather than private identities, we have two main ones: citizen and consumer. Not every single person is a
citizen of course, but the vast majority of us—93 percent are. And we’re all consumers, whether we want
to be or not.” (footnotes omitted)).
109. Id. at 151 (emphasis deleted). From one perspective, the connection between consumer autonomy
and political identity goes back to the foundations of the nation. See MARY BETH NORTON, 1774: THE
LONG YEAR OF REVOLUTION 4–10 (2020) (describing how the events leading to the American Revolution
were rooted in American consumption of tea and policies surrounding access to the market for tea). There
is reason to believe that a reassertion of core liberal values is of more general concern to the health and
well-being of the world’s democracies. See Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, It Is Not Hard to Figure Out Why
Freedom
Is
in
Decline,
WASH.
POST.
(Mar.
4,
2021,
10:30
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/04/freedom-house-less-free-world/
[https://perma.cc/46UF-S2RP] (describing evidence of the decline of democracies worldwide and some
forces that explain the decline).
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law that define us as a people and as individual citizens. Instead, we
are subject to a regime in which large private actors dictate our legal
identities through processes that amount to the private repeal of
publicly promulgated protections, such as the right to a jury trial or the
right to merchantable goods.110
The economic damage, caused by such arrangement, is also
manifest. At a microeconomic level, Professor Oren Bar-Gill has
demonstrated how the enforcement of form devices results in an
across-the-board extraction of inefficient pricing in high-volume
consumer contracting domains.111 Bar-Gill and others have argued that
the macroeconomic effects of these form devices include the aftermath
of the 2008 financial collapse, particularly as it relates to consumer
debt in the mortgage markets. 112
Commerce will continue, however, and electronic contracts will
continue to be an important part of permitting parties to define the
scope of the agreements they enter. Can commerce continue in a
manner that realistically addresses the problem of consumer incapacity
identified above, or must we cede to the consumer domination that
these contracts induce?
Building on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
observations, which borrow from developments in consumer product
safety law within the area of torts, this Article proposes a solution that
will help to restore consumer capacity by harnessing developments
that have otherwise exacerbated it.
110. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975) (“But the
inevitable result of enforcing all provisions of the adhesion contract . . . delivered subsequent to the
transaction and containing provisions never assented to, would be . . . a recognition that persons’ rights
shall be controlled by private lawmakers without consent, express or implied, of those affected.”); see
also Abha Bhattarai, As Closed-Door Arbitration Soared Last Year, Workers Won Cases Against
Employers Just 1.6 Percent of the Time, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/27/mandatory-arbitration-family-dollar/
[https://perma.cc/PH7P-MMPD] (“U.S. employers relied heavily on arbitration in the first months of the
pandemic, pushing a record number of complaints involving discrimination, harassment, wage theft and
other grievances through a closed-door system largely weighted against consumers and workers,
according to a report being released this week.”).
111. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 25, at 3 (“As contractual complexity increases in response to
consumers’ imperfect rationality, the cost of comparison shopping also increases, resulting in hindered
competition.”).
112. See id. at 117 (discussing connection between distortions in consumer contracting market and
collapse of world economy in 2008).
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This Article further proposes a default rule that permits the law to
rely upon technology we know has been imported or could be imported
into form contracts that would facilitate greater negotiation. This
Article thus proposes a standard that would require behavior beyond
clicking, “I Agree,” as a threshold to a finding of a manifestation of
mutual assent. This proposal will ensure consumer engagement and
mitigate the dominance that currently defines the law of consumer
contracts.113
III. THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT: A SAFER CONTRACT FOR
CONSUMERS IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THAN WHICH KAUDERS
SECURES
A. What Emerging Gaming Technology Demonstrates About the
Possibility for Greater Consumer Engagement
The technology now available to ordinary consumers and sellers in
the marketplace by which consumers can facilitate precise transactions
online around dynamic pricing tracked to risk, opting in and out of
various consumer options, is astonishing. To sample this phenomenon,
one need only to visit the recreational training platform for risk
calculation provided by DraftKings, an online sports betting
business.114
In New Hampshire and other states, consumers may now legally
access DraftKings to place wagers on the outcomes of various sporting
events.115 The platform allows consumers to deposit credit in an
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 18 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (requiring manifestation of
mutual assent to obtain a formed contract); see also id. § 19(1) (describing how assent by conduct may
arise but that conduct need not signal assent “wholly” as opposed to “partly”).
114. See
Who
We
Are,
DRAFTKINGS,
https://www.draftkings.com/about/who-we-are/
[https://perma.cc/28SH-R9FH].
115. See Sports Betting in New Hampshire Expands with Opening of Draftkings Sportsbook at
Manchester, DRAFTK INGS (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.draftkings.com/about/news/2020/09/sportsbetting-in-new-hampshire-expands-with-opening-of-draftkings-sportsbook-at-manchester/
[https://perma.cc/AG5Z-N6S9]. In the interest of full disclosure, the law firm that I work for represents
DraftKings in the government affairs domain. I have not participated in that representation and have not
interacted with DraftKings except for personal, recreational purposes. None of the information outlined
in this Article is the product of any professional interface with DraftKings as a client. In this Article, I use
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account, place wagers on outcomes at various levels, calculate
favorable outcomes based upon odds, track odds as they change over
the life of the wager, and calculate the value of “cashing out”
mid-bet.116
Consider the following life of a wager permitted on DraftKings from
the standpoint of a consumer. On February 16, 2021, a consumer
deposits one-hundred dollars in a DraftKings account.117

DraftKings for pedagogical purposes. The availability of ever greater technology around contracting,
contract terms, and contracting pricing is a widely acknowledged phenomenon. See What Is Contract
Negotiation?,
IRONCLAD,
https://ironcladapp.com/blog/what-is-contract-negotiation/
[https://perma.cc/5Q87-LNZH] (describing emerging contracting software as “powerful and highly
customizable”). The phenomenon of “smart contracting” in which technology facilitates self-enforcing
transactions that are rule-based and automated has been the grist for substantial academic discussion. See
generally Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305 (2017)
(analyzing “smart contracts” with reference to traditional contract law).
116. See How to Bet 101: Sports Betting Explained, DRAFTKINGS SPORTSBOOK,
https://sportsbook.draftkings.com/how-to-bet [https://perma.cc/7TVY-8TXD].
117. See infra Figure 1.
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That evening, at 6:30 p.m., the consumer places a twenty-dollar bet
on Rafael Nadal to defeat Stefanos Tsitsipas in the Quarterfinals of the
2021 Australian Open.118

118. See infra Figure 2.
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In this way, the technology permits the consumer to “opt in” to a
wager at the price of their choosing, which also demonstrates to the
consumer the real-time costs and benefits of doing so.119
The consumer’s bet constitutes a choice among a host of different
options for betting and risk-taking, which the consumer may view
among a host of “opting in” possibilities.120

119. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–21 (2014) (discussing
psychological features surrounding choices that facilitate opting in and out of transactions and the extent
to which those features may bolster choice in response to failures of cognition).
120. See supra Figure 2.
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When the consumer enters the wager in the appropriate field after
selecting the chosen risk, an internal function indicates to the consumer
the payout the consumer stands to receive if the consumer is
successful.121
At 6:35 p.m., the consumer checks on the bet and observes that they
can “cash out” for nineteen dollars.122

121. See supra Figure 2.
122. See infra Figure 4.
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At 6:05 a.m. the next day, the consumer checks again—during the
match—and determines that they can “cash out” for $23.94.123 The
match odds changed considerably since 6:35 p.m. the previous day. A
consumer tracking the transaction can make a series of decisions to act
or not act at various times around the developing risks of doing so.

123. See infra Figure 5.
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The consumer ultimately cashes out a few minutes later for
$23.91.124 The consumer, once again, has the option of negotiating
with the platform in real time to facilitate a transaction.

124. See infra Figure 6.
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The “cash out” amount available to the consumer modulates based
upon the changing odds of the outcome, in real time, over the life of
the bet, as are other aspects of what DraftKings calls “In-Game
Bets.”125
Throughout the process, the consumer is negotiating terms,
expressly or implicitly, through the functionality of the DraftKings
platform, which permits negotiation against fluctuating price and risk
information that the platform incorporates into its gaming system. 126
What this functioning indicates is that technology has advanced to
such an extent that online sellers can calculate the price of qualitative
positions adopted by consumers, in real-time, based upon data the
seller can mine from the world of information about the transaction
and the evolving or changing market surrounding the transaction. The
platform’s functioning thus demonstrates that technology has, in fact,
advanced to the extent that it permits substantial negotiation around
risk and risk calculation, including through functions that permit ever
more tailored interactivity between the seller and consumer of risk
positions.127
To be clear, DraftKings is not offered here as an example of a
platform that is consumer-friendly to all consumers in every way.128
Nor is it offered as the perfect fit for all markets and transactions
125. See Live In-Game Bets, DRAFTKINGS SPORTSBOOK, https://sportsbook.draftkings.com/help/howto-bet-live-bets [https://perma.cc/3JKT-4FLH]. DraftKings describes live betting as the following:
Live betting allows you to bet in real time while the action is unfolding. . . .
Odds will be representative of the likelihood of any of those events occurring, but
beware; as live odds are dynamic, they are constantly going up and down. So, if
you see something juicy, make sure you take it.
Id.
126. See id. Nadal ultimately lost the match, and so the consumer’s decision to cash out turned out to
be a good risk assessment given the trajectory of the match and the timing of the consumer’s decision.
See Jack Michaels & Matt Walsh, The Four Keys to Stefanos Tsitsipas’ Australian Open Comeback over
Rafael Nadal, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/30917486/the-four-keysstefanos-tsitsipas-australian-open-comeback-rafael-nadal [https://perma.cc/664U-BKNA] (“The Greek
joined Roger Federer and Fabio Fognini as the only players to ever come from two sets down to defeat
the 20-time Grand Slam Champion Rafael Nadal.”).
127. See Kyle Scott, DraftKings Sportsbook Review: Why It’s the Best Online Sportsbook, CROSSING
BROAD,
https://www.crossingbroad.com/sports-betting/draftkings-sportsbook-review
[https://perma.cc/QCM3-7GY8] (Sept. 3, 2021) (discussing this functionality, along with an explanation
of odds calculations and array of betting options).
128. See id. (“The interface is not perfect, but it’s clean and usable and instantly familiar to casual and
experienced bettors alike.”).
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facilitated by e-commerce. Instead, DraftKings is offered as an
example of the technology available to businesses throughout the
marketplace that has the ability to generally facilitate greater
transparency and interactivity when it comes to consumer-facing,
moment-to-moment choice and valuation. In other words, the
existence of this technology in a mass consumer market designed for
the millions of sports gamblers demonstrates the functional
marketability of such platforms.
One can therefore safely assume that even far more minimal
functionality than what DraftKings permits, specifically around price
disaggregation and opt in, opt out functionality on the consumer side,
could cross domains in various forms for various purposes. As a
further example, individuals familiar with the functionality of online
travel companies, the dynamic contracting options, and the capacity
for negotiation of various terms and conditions permitted by these
online travel companies also know that this more interactive
functionality has existed, with regard to some aspects of the consumer
experience, for some time.129
When one thinks about these commerce-facilitating, mutable, and
negotiable consumer forms, one can imagine, with regard to the Uber
terms and conditions described in Kauders, how Uber could use
similar but less mutable technology to put a price on any term or
condition that demands a waiver or limitation of liability, a disclaimer
of warranty, or a requirement of mandatory arbitration that one may
opt in or out of in a more itemized way that discloses price. Uber, after
all, is in possession of an enormous amount of information about its
consumers, its drivers, and its market; so, Uber should be in a position

129. See, e.g., Jessica MacDonald, The 8 Best Online Travel Agencies of 2021, TRIPSAVVY,
https://www.tripsavvy.com/best-online-travel-agencies-4776301 [https://perma.cc/K34Q-59S2] (Feb. 8,
2021). The article describes one online travel company as the following:
The interface is also easy to use. On the home page, search for a hotel by entering
your chosen destination and dates. Then, use the extensive list of filters to narrow
the results down and find the best fit for you. You can also search for a specific
hotel, or seek inspiration by clicking through portfolios grouped by destination
or property type. The flights, car rental, and other tabs are just as intuitive.
Id.
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to price and render negotiable each term valuable to it.130 The changing
nature of this data may even explain why its terms and conditions also
change so often, consistent with an observation the Kauders court
made about Uber’s terms and conditions.131
Given the mutability of its forms, the law could and should require
Uber to use its own data to disaggregate price and permit greater
interaction and choice among terms from consumers. Such an
approach would put the burden on Uber to disclose to the consumer
the price it places on any given term and condition. It would permit
greater consumer scrutiny into the pricing position of Uber and permit
the consumer more agency in the negotiation over terms and
conditions.
For instance, imagine combining DraftKings’ apparent functionality
with Uber’s policy regarding its liability for its drivers. Instead of
presenting terms as a fait de accompli, the terms would include an
opt-in functionality that shifts price based on actuarial data. So, the
provisions quoted above132 might be separated as follows:
ANY INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL
OR
OTHER
DAMAGES OF ANY TYPE OR KIND (INCLUDING
PERSONAL INJURY, LOSS OF DATA, REVENUE,
PROFITS, USE OR OTHER ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE).
[Field allowing a consumer to purchase these rights from the
provider at a price that the consumer can compare to prices
offered by other providers]
[UBER] SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS,
DAMAGE OR INJURY WHICH MAY BE INCURRED
BY YOU . . . . YOU EXPRESSLY WAIVE AND
RELEASE [UBER] FROM ANY AND ALL ANY [sic]
130. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2017).
131. Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 1033, 1041 (Mass. 2021).
132. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 80.
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LIABILITY, CLAIMS OR DAMAGES ARISING FROM
OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE THIRD PARTY
TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER.
[Field allowing a consumer to purchase these rights from the
provider at a price that the consumer can compare to prices
offered by other providers].133
A similar modification could be applied to the electronic hospital
form presented to me and served as the introductory anecdote to this
Article. The following clause would be enforceable if the form
conveying it permitted some amount of negotiation to the patient as
follows:
I understand and acknowledge that [hospital] cannot be
held . . . liable for the conduct of these providers.
[Field allowing a consumer to purchase these rights from the
provider at a price that the consumer can compare to prices
offered by other providers].134
The approach of disaggregating price and terms and permitting an
“opt-in” option is not foreign to the consumer market or Uber’s
market—the short-term car possession and transportation market.
Consumers who have rented cars at the airport are very familiar with
the process of deciding whether to purchase insurance and whether to
prepay on gas under disadvantageous terms; however, consumers still
have the choice to opt out from purchasing these options.135
133. See discussion supra Part III.A.
134. Treatment Authorization, supra note 7; see supra text accompanying notes 8–15. For a discussion
of the Author’s modification of the terms of the form, see infra Part III.B.
135. See Ed Perkins, 9 Nasty Truths About Car Rental Insurance, SMARTERTRAVEL,
https://www.smartertravel.com/car-rental-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/8469-MNCG] (Aug. 5, 2021)
(describing insurance transactions in the car-rental industry). One account indicates that the terms for
purchasing car rental insurance exceed actuarial pricing by many multiples. Id. (“Typically, a CDW starts
at around $30 per day and can go higher. It sometimes costs even more than the base car rental rate. The
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Conversely, Uber’s approach, and the approach of most online
commercial sellers, effectively strips the consumer of their power to
negotiate around similar terms by demanding that the consumer
purchase a type of insurance through a mandated, one-sided statement
of changing terms and conditions without even providing its
consumers with the limited options available with respect to car
rentals.136
B. How Emerging Technology Can Serve as a Benchmark for
Restoring Intelligibility to the Law of Consumer Contracts
Considering what this Article has demonstrated, the question it now
raises is whether the law should demand innovation of this sort from
the marketplace that invalidates the one-sided approach described
immediately above. The argument this Article advances is that it must
do so for the law of consumer contracts to remain intelligible.137
From this standpoint, the law of consumer contracts must make
sense within the two domains in which it is situated. It must make
sense within a defensible definition of the law of consumer protection
and within a defensible description of the law of contracts.
In the first domain, the law of consumer protection has developed
such that liability attaches where consumer products either fail to abide
actuarial cost to the rental company—the amount it would allocate toward a damage pool based on risk
experience—is probably just a few dollars a day; the rest is theirs to keep. No wonder the agents push it
so hard: It’s clearly a lot more profitable than the car rental alone.”); see Linkov, supra note 25
(recommending that consumers refuse to engage in negotiations with dealers on terms in which dealers
aggregate a series of contract proposals into one lump-sum price). Real-time price calculation is also the
hallmark of online travel reservations, more generally. See, e.g., Low Fare Tips, KAYAK,
https://www.kayak.com/help/lowfares [https://perma.cc/Y8ZP-WYG9] (discussing how prices change
for travel depending on certain circumstances). At least one problem scholars have identified in the field
of consumer contracting is the disparity between perceived price and actual price in a series of consumer
markets where form contracting has proliferated. See BAR-GILL, supra note 25, at 10 (“Benefits and prices
are a function of product attributes and use patterns. Product attributes define what a product is and what
it does. They include product features, contract terms, and prices. . . . Product attributes affect the total
benefit and total price. Misperceptions about product attributes lead to misperceptions of the total benefit
and total price.”).
136. See MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 49–50 (3d ed. 2019) (discussing
how liability rules result in the consumer marketplace imposing an insurance effect by spreading risk and
cost of injury through the market to one degree or another).
137. Cf. Danielle D’Onfro, Error-Resilient Consumer Contracts, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3785020 [https://perma.cc/V6GP-RNK8]
(arguing that it is a “mistake” for courts to “ease up” on contract formalities as technology develops).
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by industry custom or fail to keep pace with advances in the
marketplace—recognizing the capacity of industry to deliver safer
products into the marketplace. 138 Standards of liability shift with
technological innovation.139 Thus, where once we asked and answered
the question, “Should manufacturers place seatbelts in cars?,” we can
expect to ask the question in the near term, “Should manufacturers
produce cars that humans, and not robots, may drive?”140
In conveying a car as a matter of law, however, the transaction
conveys the physical object of the car as well as the series of legal
rights, privileges, and obligations that comprise the legal identity of
the car.141 For instance, in conveying a car, the seller provides the full
gamut of legal rights, privileges, and obligations that comprise the
138. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 658–60 (3d ed. 2015) (describing “state of the
art” tests as requiring that products be designed to meet standards of safety reasonably knowable to
designers based upon evolving technology (footnotes omitted)); WAYNE E. LEWIS & GARY L.
MONSERUD, SALES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 240 (2017) (“Strict liability arose as a way to shift the burden
of loss for defective and unsafe products that cause injury, to the manufacturers and sellers who: (1)
created the risks by placing the goods in the marketplace; (2) were in the best position to detect, assess
and prevent those risks before the products were made available to the public; (3) induced the purchase
of the products and the reasonable expectations that they were safe and suitable for use; (4) profited from
their sale; and (5) have the best potential to spread the loss.”); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 22, at
309–10 (identifying jurisdictions where industry custom is the standard and proposing a standard for tort
liability that encourages innovation for the purpose of encouraging ever more inventive strategies to
deliver safer products); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 587 (2005) (“Both
the tort system and the FDA seek to protect consumers of medical products. The tort system provides
compensation when a consumer is harmed by a defective product and sets incentives for companies to
design safer products.”).
139. See OWEN, supra note 138, at 658–59; Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE
L.J. 1320, 1388 (2017) (using the example of increased understanding of brain injuries from football due
to innovation in understanding brain injuries but noting that liability may depend upon the values of the
community where the injury took place). Judge Learned Hand noted, however, that a “whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.” Harry M. Philo, Use of Safety
Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 4 (1965) (quoting The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
140. See Tania Leiman, Law and Tech Collide: Foreseeability, Reasonableness and Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems, 40 POL’Y & SOC’Y 250, 263 (2021) (“Data shows it is foreseeable that human error
is likely to cause motor vehicle crashes and that ADAS can significantly reduce both likelihood of
collision and the capacity for that error to adversely impact vehicle operation.”).
141. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 77 (5th ed. 2007) (“From a legal
viewpoint, property is a bundle of rights. These rights describe what people may and may not do with
resources they own: the extent to which they may possess, use, develop, improve, transform, consume,
deplete, destroy, sell, donate, bequeath, transfer, mortgage, lease, loan, or exclude others from their
property.”); see also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 17–22 (1990) (describing vocabulary
of rights, privileges, duties, and obligations developed by Prof. Hohfeld with respect to American law).
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ownership package, including warranties that the car is in working
condition.142 Baked into these rights, privileges, and obligations are a
series of underlying default legal rights, privileges, and expectations
that include the right to seek relief if the conveyance causes injury. 143
In the context of an online transaction like the one facilitated by
Uber’s service contract, the conveyance is the service of facilitating a
car ride online. Analogizing to the conveyance of the car itself, one
would expect that the service, which includes the mechanism of
purchasing and securing the ride, would be safe for the consumer of
Uber’s services. So one would expect, at least, that this service is
provided in a manner that is safe and consistent with industry practices.
The Kauders court indicated that this is its view when it relies upon
evidence of technology that Uber deploys to demonstrate greater
engagement with the contracting process, through click-through
manifestations of assent. 144 The Kauders court thus verifies its
assessment of online forms, like those presented by Uber, are subject
to the sort of analysis imposed within the domain of consumer
protection law, more generally, when assessing the entire gamut of
rights, obligations, and privileges a contract seeks to convey, including
rights to a jury trial (as opposed to mandatory arbitration). 145
But the Kauders court stops short of verifying whether it is correct
about whether the baseline standards it sets gives us credible assurance
that consumers are assenting. It equates the “click through” function
with a manifestation of assent, even though “click through” does not
indicate engagement, understanding, or even attention, as studies on
these ubiquitous so-called agreements indicate. 146 It is doubtful that
142. See, e.g., Felley v. Singleton, 705 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing Weng v. Allison,
678 N.E.2d 1254, 1255–56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)) (car conveyed with the promise that it was in good
condition transferred the subsidiary right to expect that the car had workable brakes).
143. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE L. 2020)
(describing the implied warranty of merchantability).
144. See Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 1033, 1050–51 (Mass. 2021).
145. See generally id. at 1047–55 (analyzing rights people have under contracts, reasonable notice, and
manifestation of assent and applying these rights to Uber’s terms and conditions).
146. See id. at 1051 (“Requiring an expressly affirmative act, therefore, such as clicking a button that
states ‘I Agree,’ can help alert users to the significance of their actions. Where they so act, they have
reasonably manifested their assent.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine
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“clicking through” even demonstrates “notice” if one considers how
people generally engage with this sort of form when they transact. 147
In this way, the Kauders court sets standards that continue to facilitate
an unsafe environment for consumers’ contract rights, which are
central to their ability to exert agency and control over their lives.
If the Kauders court approach seeks to take contracts and contract
law seriously, the example it provides, looking to available technology
to determine how to approximate assent, would instead ask if there is
available technology that would serve as a more reliable proxy for
determining assent. Other than by citing to precedent that does not
update its thinking around technology and behavior proxies for states
of mind, the court does not explain why in doing so a court must
confine itself to technology deployed by Uber. 148 Platforms like those
developed by DraftKings, online travel companies, or other online
businesses suggest that technology facilitating a far greater capacity
for negotiation and engagement by the consumer (1) exists, (2) is
well-known, and (3) could serve as one benchmark for measuring
engagement, decision-making capacity, and assent.149
Indeed, this Article illustrates one potential example of an electronic
form that would facilitate negotiation at a rudimentary level from a
design standpoint.150 The contract I described at the beginning of this
Article incorporated an even more rudimentary form of what
Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2014) (“The proposition that most people do not read the small print,
heed the warning labels, or review the ‘Terms and Conditions’ links, is no longer controversial.
Nonetheless, the barrage of fine-print disclosures continues unabated, and enforcement of universally
unread terms is assumed.”).
147. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 146, at 1777–78.
148. See Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1050–51 (citing to cases that found users assented to online
agreements when they clicked that they agreed to the terms and conditions).
149. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Rachel Wohl, Mindfulness in the Heat of Conflict: Taking STOCK,
20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 121, 123 (2015) (“Mindfulness—a certain way of paying attention—can help
overcome these obstacles and improve decision-making in negotiations and other conflict-related
situations.”). The same article discusses well-known findings in the area of behavior economics
demonstrating how deliberative and more “mindful” decisionmaking leads to better decisionmaking but
is obstructed by how cognition defaults to intuition in a manner that leads to poorer decisionmaking. Id.
at 127 (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13, 20–30, 85–88 (2012)). We might also
consider other goals when we think about shaping our society and its governing rules. See ERIC A. POSNER
& E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY,
at xxiii (2018) (ebook) (“What can be done to make [the digital world] as functional, pleasant, dignified,
humane, and creative as possible?”).
150. See supra Part I.
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DraftKings’ technology indicates exists.151 Instead of presenting the
consumer with a take-it-or-leave-it waiver of their rights against
third-party employees, the law should demand that the form permit the
consumer to access a data field that prices the value of that right to the
healthcare provider.152 As the consumer, I could then choose to opt in
to or opt out of the liability waiver, and I (and regulators) would know
how the hospital values the liability waiver. 153
This option would not only assure that I had greater agency in the
transaction by requiring greater engagement (for example, that I
choose to purchase the right), but permitting choice beyond the
take-it-or-leave-it standard would also take a substantial step toward
creating an environment in which a consumer could demonstrate
restored capacity through the act of using intelligence to choose or
reject terms. This injects (1) dynamic choice and (2) the possibility of
minimal levels of finer-tuned negotiation around terms that seek to
remove protections otherwise conferred upon individuals by the public
into the contract through pricing and even dynamic pricing with opt-in
functionality of the sort we see with DraftKings’ technology. In other
words, it does so through recordable mechanisms indicating better
evidence of engagement and thus better and more reliable evidence of
assent.154
The option to opt in or opt out does not cave to the sort of inertia
around consumer engagement that has given rise to the notion,
proposed within the ALI—that “blanket assent” is the best or better
solution possible for American consumers. 155 It even has the benefit of
turning gaming, or other recreational technology meant to attract
consumers to one sort of activity, into a device for engaging consumers
around an exercise in the pricing out of their legal rights; perhaps
initiating in the consumer a greater investment in what these rights are
151. See supra Part III.
152. See supra INTRODUCTION.
153. See supra INTRODUCTION.
154. This low-level indication of agreement pales in comparison to what courts demand of parties by
way of negotiation to settled terms in business to business agreements. See Choi & Triantis, supra note
25, at 444–46 (describing stages of negotiation, preliminary agreement, and final agreement and
describing interaction of the law of contract formation with each stage of negotiation).
155. See infra Conclusion.
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and why they may be important to a citizen in a society embracing
republicanism.156
The purveyors of electronic form contracts may object that
demanding this, more generally, would cause contracts to become
unmanageable, unmanageably long, or an inefficient device for
facilitating transactions. But this objection does not deal with the
central conceptual problem that, whether the contract is efficient,
manageable, or neither, these forms are not contracts at all under any
realistic and defensible understanding of the concept but rather
one-sided term sheets foisted upon increasingly incapable and disabled
consumers by large-scale sellers of goods and services.157 If purveyors
of these forms truly care about the rights they are asking consumers to
waive and believe that these rights must apply in a transaction,
purveyors should choose those rights carefully and ensure that they are
credibly salient and understood 158 or make the decision to assume the

156. Cf. D’Onfro, supra note 137 (manuscript at 33) (noting that some consumer contracts are “barely
voluntary, particularly in the medical and utilities context”).
157. See ANDERSON, supra note 64, at 66 (“The rule of law is a complex ideal encompassing several
protections of subjects’ liberties[,] . . . [including that] [a]uthority may be exercised only through laws
duly passed and publicized in advance . . . .”); see also Lewis, supra note 1, at 130 (“Consumer contracts
are not contracts. They are one-sided expressions of a more powerful party’s preferences drafted by
attorneys working for companies and foisted on consumers who have no idea what they mean and no
ability to negotiate as coequal parties to the deal.”); cf. ANDERSON, supra note 64, at 44–45 (describing
the definition of private government and the proliferation of efforts to impose private government on
people within the employment context).
158. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 25, at 91. Bar-Gill describes the situation as the following:
Faced with the complex, multidimensional credit card contract, imperfectly rational
consumers will not be able to focus equally on all terms. Only a handful of terms
will be salient.
. . . Salient features will be made attractive by lowering prices on these features and
increasing the benefits that they provide. Non-salient features, on the other hand,
will constitute revenue centers. They will be designed to cover the issuer’s costs
and pay for the salient benefits.
Id. Some jurisdictions have adopted plain language requirements in certain contracts, implicitly
recognizing the problem of consumer incapacity with regard to many consumer contracts. See Plain
Language Consumer Contract Act, 73 PA. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 2202(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021
Regular Session Act 70) (“By passing this act, the General Assembly wants to promote the writing of
consumer contracts in plain language. This act will protect consumers from making contracts that they do
not understand. It will help consumers know better their rights and duties under those contracts.”). Laws
like these have existed for some time and do not appear to have altered consumer contracting practices.
See Rosemary Moukad, Note, New York’s Plain English Law, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451, 451 (1980)
(describing New York’s law which was promulgated in the late 1970s).
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risk in favor of the overall benefit of selling goods and services in a
marketplace governed by publicly promulgated default rules. 159
CONCLUSION
Courts have set too low a credible threshold when seeking evidence
of consumer interaction with electronic contracts sufficient to
demonstrate a manifestation of mutual assent. Technological
innovation illustrates far greater possibility for establishing
benchmarks that achieve real assent. The law of consumer protection
provides an intelligible conceptual mechanism for “truing up” what
contract law should demand in this domain, and the negotiability of
any given form contract should become the standard for contract
formation if the definition of what it means to contract is to retain any
level of integrity. Normative reasons connecting consumerism,
republicanism, and the health of a liberal democracy indicate that it
would be in the best interests of a credible legal system for the law to
adopt the framework proposed in this Article. This framework will
create incentives to secure a more engaged, dynamic, and capable
consumer population and will combat efforts to quell the consumer
population into domination thus weakening the legal standing of
Americans under circumstances where threats to democracy require a
more engaged, individualist, and empowered consumer public.

159. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 129 (proposing that different default rulesets will impact the contracting
practices of what sellers propose to consumers). The notion that some terms may become part of a de al
because a party has not accepted the contract as a whole is acknowledged by law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTS. § 19(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (describing how assent by conduct may arise but that
conduct need not signal assent made “wholly” as opposed to “partly”).
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